

REVIEWS

War With Iraq: Critical Lessons by Buster Glosson, Glosson Family Foundation, Charlotte, NC, 2003, 320 pp., \$28.95 (hardcover).

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Buster Glosson has written an autobiography based on his wartime daily diary during the first Gulf War. Like Richard P. Hallion's *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War*, it is another argument over the dominant impact of air power. Glosson, however, tells his story, from a perspective of a major player who planned and executed the air campaign against the fourth largest field army in the world.

The book's thesis emphasizes the supremacy of air power in shaping the battlefield. He believes the use of brute ground forces is a thing of the past, criticizing General Colin Powell in reference to what he calls the "old school thinking" in Washington that modern wars are won with massive ground troops. He maintains war has an enduring nature; however, the conduct of war changes with technology. Thus, his focus is on precision air power as the deciding factor in the conduct of warfighting, especially with his favored weapons system, the F-117 Stealth Fighter. Glosson credits himself for developing a new strategy with the F-117s, the backbone of the air war in Iraq, because they provided surprise and delivered precision bombs.

Quite evident, the author is a strong proponent of strategic air power as a deciding doctrine in winning modern war as indicated by his admiration for the controversial BG Billy Mitchell, who after World War I, became a strong proponent for strategic air power that impeded the development of an air-ground tactical doctrine during the interwar period. In addition, President Bush comes under criticism for abruptly ending the war before Saddam Hussein and his regime was eliminated by air power. The author notes in his diary, "history will judge."

In conclusion, Glosson lists numerous critical lessons as a baseline for future wars that can be summarized, as there is no substitute for winning with an emphasis on a minimum loss of lives. His solution is that precision air power combined with Special Forces is more decisive than an overwhelming force.

Generally, as with all autobiographies, *War With Iraq* explains history from a personal, one-sided point of view. Army readers may have trouble with the author's assertion that air power is the decisive arm capable of destroying the battlefield. This attitude brings forth the conflict between service cultures regarding the nature of modern warfighting. Air Force planners, like Glosson, viewed the application of air power as a separate campaign and as the deciding factor. Army leaders — like Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf — historically recognized the reality of wrestling terrain from an enemy, not only at the operational level, but the importance of ground tactics.

For years, Army leaders viewed air power as a means to degrade the enemy and shape the battlefield for ground operations, which was

recently demonstrated during the Iraqi campaign. One serious omission is evident. Glosson does not integrate his strategic thoughts with the doctrine that won the war in 1991, *Air-Land Battle Doctrine* that emphasized the importance of joint and combined operations.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D.
Department of History
University of Cincinnati

Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America) by Anonymous, Brasseys, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2002, 394 pp., \$29.95 (cloth).

Historians have long debated the possible changes in world history had the leaders of Europe taken Hitler's *Mein Kampf* more seriously. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler gave notice to all of his specific goals and aspirations: the conquest of Europe, the "final solution," and the germanization of much of the world were chronicled and detailed.

Now an anonymous, though obviously very well qualified, author has laid out Osama bin Laden's goals and aspirations in his war with the "Crusaders." The author believes that bin Laden's belief that the United States is intent on destroying Muslims, their religion, and the Islamic world has, in his mind, many parallels to the Crusader's attacks on his coreligionists nine centuries ago. This book provides a useful context in which to understand bin Laden's views and thought processes, bizarre as they may seem from our viewpoint.

The author points out that al Qaeda is larger, more ethnically diverse, more geographically dispersed, younger, richer, better educated, better led, and has better military training, and experience than previous terrorist groups such as Hizballah and the Abu Nidal organization. But, perhaps more ominously, al Qaeda is motivated to a far greater extent than other groups by Islamic extremism.

Bin Laden's early years are well chronicled with a clear focus on his development as a leader, who now claims to have been at war with the United States directly since 1996. We have, to our detriment, not been quick to pick up on this fact. We are accustomed to being at war with nation states and find it difficult to refocus on war with a worldwide terrorist organization, which is both difficult to find and difficult to counter by conventional means. The Khobar Towers bombing, attacks on tourists in Egypt, the destruction of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the attack on the *USS Cole* in Yemen, and the 11 September attacks on the U.S., stand out as major events in his war. But bin Laden has also been instrumental in launching "Jihads" in Uzbekistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and the Philippines against the "atheists and infidels" of the world.

Bin Laden's stated goals are to annihilate the U.S.-led enemies of Islam (the Crusaders), to restore Muslim dignity, holy places, and lost territory. He wants the U.S. out of Muslim territory and the complete restoration of Palestine

to the Palestinians. The author describes how militants throughout the Islamic world are enraged by what they believe is Western aggression against their people, religion, and culture. Though bin Laden has declared war on America, not once, but twice, the author argues that American complacency in the face of such violent threats stems from the increasing secularization and moral relativism of our society and culture.

This is a book that all professional soldiers should read since it represents, in significant detail, the views and motivation of one of our primary adversaries, while clearly defining the severity of the ongoing threat. There are 107 pages of notes and sources, which clearly indicate the high level of scholarship put forth by the author. The author clearly supports his thesis, which generally is that bin Laden and his followers may represent the most dangerous and inclusive threat the U.S. has ever faced.

BG DAVID FUNK
U.S. Army, Retired

The World War II 100 by Howard J. Langer, New Page Books, Franklin Lakes, NJ, 2002, 335 pp., \$27.99 (hardcover).

Often in reference works, there is no writing style, which can make a book boring, but this was not the case for me with *The World War II 100*. The more I read, the more I wanted to read.

What made it readable was the author's approach in rating the persons he has chosen as the top 100, and cross-referencing them throughout the book. I started reading at random, picking out names from the table of contents, just to get a sense of what was inside. Then as I began reading the book, I concentrated on the European theater of operations listings first, and then went onto the Pacific.

In the Preface, the author identifies the eight major powers of the time: The United States, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Italy, France, China, and Japan, and he has chosen the 100 most influential persons of WWII, mainly from these countries, although other countries are represented.

He includes not only political and military leaders, but diplomats, scientists, intelligence people, and as he notes, "warriors and victims." Within this group, he selects those who had great influence and chose to use it, or in some cases, those who had great influence and chose not to use it. Some are well known, while others are not.

Each entry starts with an analysis of what the author feels the person's main WWII influence was (or could have been), followed by a brief biographical background, and then a description of what the outcome of that person's influence was, and what happened to the individual.

The author has maintained discipline in devoting two to three pages to each person or subject. It is a good formula, because you

know what to expect. It's not easy to summarize an individual's salient accomplishments in such a limited space, especially when one considers that most of these people had very full lives, but Langer has done a good job.

The author agrees that his selection of the 100 is subjective, and he can accept a reader's arguments that someone should be listed higher or lower, but he does so with the exclusion of the first eight, which he believes are entirely correct, as he has ranked them. These are Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Marshall, Yamamoto, Eisenhower, and MacArthur.

I honestly did not pay much attention to the number rankings, but I did take exception to the author's stated rationale for his write up on George S. Patton, whom he ranks number 11: "Patton is included here for one major achievement: the containment of German forces, coupled with the relief of Bastogne, during the Battle of the Bulge." While the importance of this action cannot be overstated, the author's comment ignores the earlier magnificent achievement of Patton and his 3rd Army when he drove the enemy across France, with speed and aggressiveness, in just a matter of weeks, from July to early September, to within 63 miles of Germany. Had fuel and other resources not been diverted for Market Garden, the conclusion of WWII in Europe would surely have been earlier.

I found somewhat disturbing a comment made by the author on page 10 of the Preface: "Sometimes I have described an event based on speculation..." Does this mean guesswork? If that is the case, it is unfortunate, because this can cast doubt on credibility.

A minus goes to one element of production. While the book is hardcover, easy to handle, and the type style legible, there is a screened background of a map on the first page of each sketch — the map is either of the ETO or the Pacific, depending on the person who is being written up — a clever idea that did not work out, because the screened background (at least in my copy) is very dark, and that makes the first page of each sketch difficult to read.

Probably every reader will have a nomination of someone who should be included in the top 100 and who does not appear in this book. Mine is Field Marshall Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in the United States. He had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the time of Dunkirk, and in his position with the United States, he often acted as a conduit between Roosevelt and Churchill, accomplishing much to enhance cooperation between the Allies. He worked closely with General Marshall, who held him in high praise. He served both countries exceedingly well, and a joint resolution of Congress recognized his contributions. He died of illness in late 1944 and is buried at Arlington Cemetery. I believe him to be the only non-U.S. citizen to be so honored.

There are photos at the start of each sketch and most of these are very good. There is an appendix with a listing of "Also-Rans" not included in the 100, an appendix with the chrono-

nology of WWII, an appendix with the nationalities of the 100, an index of names, an index of subjects, and a bibliography. There is also a brief history of World War II before the individual sketches.

I enjoyed reading this book, learned some things I didn't know, and am glad to have it in my library.

PAUL S. MEYER
Former USAARMS Information Officer
and Armor School Historian
Cincinnati, OH

Judgment at Tokyo, The Japanese War Crimes Trials by Tim Maga, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2001, 171 pp., \$25.00.

The title of this short book is misleading. The major content concerns the Japanese war crime trials, this is true. However, the problems exposed and the concepts examined go far beyond those trials. Present day military, political, and social leaders should be interested in them. They loom large in the present-day problems concerning the UN and the situation in Iraq.

The author has conducted extensive research with respect to the Japanese trials and has chosen critical ones to examine. Generally credited to the work of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo, during the period May 1946 through November 1948, trials actually took place before the establishment of the IMTFE in the Pacific islands (most notably Guam) and at least 10 locations in China, and continued into the 1950s. The most spectacular ones are associated with the IMTFE prosecution of Japanese leaders.

Almost every aspect of the trials can be questioned to some degree, from the legal code employed, to the most minor details. The author explains that the most basic issue questioned if the trials were the punishment of the loser of the war by the victors. Defense lawyers constantly advanced charges of racism, the inability to understand Japanese culture, and the misunderstanding of how the Japanese waged war based on that culture. They also brought up such actions as the U.S. employment of the nuclear weapon and the treatment of Japanese in the United States during the war. Also, as the author emphasizes, at what level of military command and civilian control could the responsibility be placed for the brutal actions charged, and did the upper levels of authority and command approve and know of the horrible deeds of lower levels.

The author points out that in one of the most sensational cases — that of General Yamashita — the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case in December 1945 for review. In a majority opinion, the court concluded that he had failed to control the actions of his own troops — a violation of the laws of war and military conduct. However, at least one Justice criticized the evidence provided, saying much was raw opinion as opposed to fact. General Ya-

mashita was executed in February 1946 — a rush to judgment?

As pointed out in the book, the IMTFE justices' report suggested in 1948, a permanent legal apparatus to be ready in the future to try and convict war criminals. As a result of The Hague-based tribunal on crimes against humanity committed in former Yugoslavia, the concept was advanced to form a permanent war crimes court attached to the United Nations. In July 1998, an international summit of 160 nations in Rome proposed such a tribunal's jurisdiction and power to investigate any country at any time be established. The summit, with 10 nations dissenting, voted in favor of a permanent International Criminal Court, composed of 18 judges from 18 nations to serve 9-year terms. The U.S. was one of the dissenters. Sixty nations would have to ratify to bring the proposed court into being. Eighteen judges took their seats at the world's first permanent war crimes court at The Hague, Netherlands in February 2003.

The final question posed by the author in this book remains unanswered: "The question of what constituted 'proper' accountability still had no answer."

LEO D. JOHNS
COL, U.S. Army, Retired
Midlothian, VA

Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940 by Ronald E. Powaski, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 2002, 400 pp., \$30.00.

It must be said to our shame that we sent our Army into that most modern war with weapons and equipment which were quite inadequate, and we had only ourselves to blame for the disasters which early overtook us in the field when fighting began in 1940.

— Sir Bernard L. Montgomery

On 10 May 1940, the quiet that was the "Phony War" ended as German tanks, infantry, artillery, and aircraft attacked all along the frontier borders with France, Belgium, and Holland. Holland and Belgium capitulated quickly, with France succumbing a scant 6 weeks after the start of the war on 25 June 1940. Only the brilliant and desperate evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Dunkirk allowed 337,000 British and French troops, including General Montgomery and the bulk of his 3d Division, to escape capture and internment in German prisoner of war camps. Powaski examines the events and the individuals critical to both sides of the Battle for France in his new book, *Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940*.

In *Lightning War*, Powaski considers the entirety of the campaign in France, from its beginnings in the defeat of Poland in September 1939, through the final agonizing moments of the surrender at Compiegne on 25 June 1940. The book's strength is drawn from Powaski's ability to animate the various personalities involved in the critical decisionmaking and ac-

tions of the campaign, both Allied and German. He begins with a fascinating description of the 10 January 1940 crash in Belgium of the aircraft carrying Luftwaffe majors Erich Hoenmanns and Helmuth Reinberger. Reinberger carried the top-secret plans for the German invasion of France and the low-countries, and his capture, and the capture of the German plans, set into motion a series of events that led to the final German plan, and the advance through the Ardennes Forest.

Powaski is equally enlightening in his account of the events that led to the German decision to stop General Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps short of the English Channel on 24 May. He carefully and fully develops the personalities and the characteristics of each of the German commanders, presenting an intimate look at how the German high command arrived at its decision, and the effects on the campaign.

Lightning War is a great synthesis — a great narrative — of the campaign for France. While it adequately covers the campaign from its nascence in the defeat of Poland through the final capitulation of the French, there are two areas that detract from the final product. Powaski divides the book into literally hundreds of subsections, some as short as three sentences. Many pages have two, and sometimes three, distinct subsections divided by a styl-

ized symbol. It is almost as if the author wrote each of the subsections at differing times, and then pieced them together chronologically in the final editing process. The end result is a choppy delivery and literary style that detracts from an otherwise fine narrative history of the Battle for France.

The second area that detracts from *Lightning War* is the author's documented sources. For a reason known but to the author, there are no footnotes in the book. Instead, Powaski chooses to group sources by section. For the reader, this means that discerning the actual source of a particular quotation or action is difficult for the shorter sections of the book, and problematic for the larger sections. It is an unfortunate choice that detracts from the body of work.

There is little attempt at analysis in *Lightning War*. Powaski makes no pretense of a theme or interpretation in the short two-page prologue. In the final chapter titled, "Aftermath," however, Powaski attempts to address many of the conundrums presented by the French collapse in 1940. Powaski writes that France was "too deeply divided by internecine ideological quarrels to pay serious attention to, and prepare for, the coming conflict with Germany." He also opines that the most important factor in explaining the French defeat was "the absence of the United States at France's side." Neither explanation is instructive.

France did, in fact, prepare for the next war with Germany, but it was simply the wrong type of war. The French wanted to fight a slogging, methodical, and controlled battle. The Germans did not allow the French the luxury of time or present them with the opportunity for a methodical battle. French leadership, training, and doctrine are the true culprits in this debacle. Robert Doughty's outstanding works on the interwar French Army and the 1940 campaign, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939* and *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940*, are much more illuminating and convincing on the subject of the French failure. As for the United States, it is difficult to imagine how a country that rejected both its own President's peace plan and the League of Nations could somehow maintain influence in Europe in the years following World War I.

The surrender of France in June 1940 stunned the world. Blitzkrieg — lightning war — entered the popular lexicon, evoking fear and awe. Despite its limitations, Powaski's new work, *Lightning War*, is an entertaining book that adds understanding to one of the most breathtaking military campaigns ever fought.

COL BUCK CONNOR
Commander, 1st Brigade
1st Infantry Division
Fort Riley, KS